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INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHMFSS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0047

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000147

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DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/RA AND ISN/NESS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2018

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [ECON](#) [AE](#)

SUBJECT: DELIVERED COMMENTS ON UAE NUCLEAR POWER WHITE PAPER

REF: SECSTATE 10779

Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4 (b & d)

¶1. (SBU) On February 3, Econchief and TDY PolEconoff met with David Scott, Abu Dhabi Executive Affairs Authority Director of Economic Affairs; Hamad Al-Kaabi, Executive Affairs Authority (and MFA); Ali Al-Frayhat, General Counsel for the Executive Affairs Authority; Mohammed Al-Hamadi, GM of the Federal Electricity and Water Authority; and Stephen Scalet, Executive Affairs Authority to discuss USG comments on the draft UAE white paper and to welcome February 7-8 consultations in Washington (reftel).

¶2. (C) Econchief conveyed reftel comments and the strong U.S. support for the UAE's interest in a fully transparent nuclear power program. Econchief also passed a copy of the USG non-paper. The UAEG representatives welcomed both USG support and the specific comments. Their initial response was positive. Scott explained that the intent of the language regarding full-scope safeguards was to give all parties comfort that the UAE would not work with nations that were not reliable members of the nuclear non-proliferation community. The UAEG did not intend to exclude nuclear weapons states such as the U.S. or France as suppliers. He expressed his appreciation for the suggested alternative formulation. With regard to the white paper's commitment to setting up a funding mechanism for training, the UAE side explained that the intent was to guarantee that funding would continue for the life of any nuclear program. They stated that they recognized there would be significant up front costs in developing trained personnel and were committed to taking that step. Scott noted that the UAE did plan to bring in international partners to operate any plants on a joint venture model, which could help address the limited UAE national human resources issue, at least initially.

¶3. (SBU) The UAE side suggested four topics for the agenda:

-- The UAE has reviewed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) principles, which were discussed during Secretary of Energy Bodman's visit, and would like to discuss those further. The UAE thinks these principles are consistent with the UAE's policy of renouncing enrichment and would like to discuss the procedures involved with GNEP.

-- The UAE will be interested in involving U.S. industry in the planning process and during implementation. The UAEG understands that there are areas of cooperation that can go forward absent a 123 agreement, but would like to better understand the process involved in negotiating a 123 agreement. (Note: Although they did not specifically request this, post also recommends a brief discussion on the scope of cooperation that U.S. companies can engage in

without such an agreement. End note.)

-- The UAE would like to discuss appropriate channels of communication moving forward. (Note: Embassy has suggested that -- at least initially -- Embassy Abu Dhabi serve as the main point of contact. End note.)

-- The UAE side would like to brief on its work with Thorium Power, the consultant which helped with the road map.

¶4. (SBU) The UAE delegation expressed appreciation for USG discretion with regard to the draft white paper. They expressed hope that once the UAE publicly launches its white paper/road map, the USG will be as supportive as possible in its media/public discussions on the subject.

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